Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals | 2026
Decisions
PARKER, et al., v. VALLIANCE BANK
2026 OK CIV APP 5
Case Number: 121526
Decided: 01/30/2026
Mandate Issued: 02/26/2026
¶1 Appellants Phillip R. Parker, the Phillip R. Parker Revocable Trust, Ki Lynn Parker, the Ki Lynn Parker Revocable Trust, Phillip R. Parker, DDS, MS, MS, P.C.; and OLD WELL, LCC (the Parkers unless otherwise stated) appeal the judgment in favor of Valliance Bank. This case arises out of the Bank’s disclosure of its customer, Greenway Park, LLC’s, financial records pursuant to a subpoena issued in a separate case. The Parkers are related in various ways to Greenway Park and maintain that the Bank’s production of Greenway Park’s financial records was negligent, violated their rights guaranteed by the Oklahoma Financial Privacy Act, 6 O.S.2021 §§ 2201-2208, and breached a fiduciary duty that the Bank owed to them. The Parkers were customers of the Bank, but they were not the “customer” whose records were subpoenaed. Although we find that the Bank’s production of records in the absence of a certificate that the requesting party had complied with the Financial Privacy Act violated a provision of the Act, we affirm the judgment in favor of the Bank.
IN THE MATTER OF J.S., JR.
2026 OK CIV APP 4
Case Number: 123281
Decided: 01/23/2026
Mandate Issued: 02/19/2026
¶1 In this deprived child proceeding, Appellant, Asheley Teague, the biological mother of J.S., JR. (JSJ), the minor child, appeals from the district court’s order terminating her parental rights. The State of Oklahoma (State) moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights, Mother waived a jury trial, and then Mother failed to appear at two subsequent scheduled hearings which were noticed by announcements memorialized in minute orders. The court minute order dated May 30, 2025, stated Mother failed to appear, but quantified “default under advisement pending best interest.” Mother appeared at the best interest trial set on June 2, 2025. State’s witness was sworn and examined and testified as to the child’s best interest. After the best interest trial, the district court found reasonable efforts were made, Mother failed to make the corrections and termination was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, Mother claims the district court erred in terminating her parental rights because the notices of May 30, 2025, hearing, i.e. the non-jury trial date, and June 2, 2025, best interest hearing were legally insufficient under 10A O.S. 2021 §1-4-905. Mother also asserts the district court erred in finding termination was in the minor child’s best interest. This Court holds the petition to terminate provided Mother with the notice required in §1-4-905(A)(1) and (2) and Mother was properly provided notice of subsequent hearings. This Court also holds State met its burden of showing it was in the child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
VERTICAL EXPLORATION, et al. v. AMERICO OIL and CORPORATION COMMISSION
2026 OK CIV APP 3
Case Number: 122360
Decided: 08/18/2026
Mandate Issued: 02/19/2026
¶1 Appellants, Vertical Exploration, LLC, and VE Holdco, LLC, appeal from an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission dismissing their application to terminate or modify a previously issued unitization order. The Commission held that Oklahoma Administrative Code (OAC) 165:5-7-20(C) only allows a plan of unitization to be amended or terminated by application to the Commission if the plan does not provide for amendment or termination. Because the unitization plan at issue contains such a provision, the Commission held it was powerless to amend or terminate its prior unitization order. For the reasons set forth below, we hold the Commission retains authority over its previously issued unitization order notwithstanding the presence of an amendment/termination provision in the unitization plan. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission’s order of dismissal and remand this matter for further proceedings.
POPULAR CONSTRUCTION v. SCISSOR-TAIL CONSTRUCTION, et al.
2026 OK CIV APP 2
Case Number: 122843
Decided: 08/18/2025
Mandate Issued: 02/12/2026
¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant Popular Construction, LLC (“Popular”) filed a mechanic’s or materialmen’s lien in May 2019. Defendant/Appellee Scissor-Tail Construction, LLC (“Scissor-Tail”) discharged the lien by posting a surety bond guaranteed by Defendant/Appellee Mid-Continent Casualty Company (“Mid-Continent”). Popular sued Scissor-Tail on the underlying debt, but its initial petition did not name Mid-Continent as a party or seek to foreclose the bond. When Popular sought leave to amend its petition, Scissor-Tail and Mid-Continent argued a foreclosure claim was time-barred as a matter of law because Popular’s motion for leave to amend was filed more than a year after the lien’s filing. Popular, on the other hand, contended the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s emergency administrative orders, which were entered during the pendency of this case as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, tolled all rules, procedures, and deadlines from March 16, 2020 through May 15, 2020, rendering its motion timely. The trial court initially agreed with Popular and granted its motion for leave to amend. It later, however, reconsidered and vacated its prior ruling. According to the court, 42 O.S. §§172 and 177 are statutes of repose; the Supreme Court’s emergency orders did not toll statutes of repose; and, as a result, both the lien and the lien discharge bond expired as a matter of law prior to Popular’s motion for leave to amend. We reverse and remand.
STEIDLEY, et al. v. SINGER, et al.
2026 OK CIV APP 1
Case Number: 121773
Decided: 06/25/2025
Mandate Issued: 01/15/2026
¶1 After a six-day trial, a jury returned favorable defamation verdicts for Plaintiffs/Appellees Janice Steidley and David Iski and found they were damaged in the respective amounts of $250,000 and $150,000. Defendant/Appellant John Singer (Singer) appeals from the trial court’s Journal Entry of Judgment reflecting the verdicts, as well as the Order denying his post-trial motions. Singer claims the court erred by denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the allegedly defamatory publications in this case were privileged and/or were made without malice, and the jury’s verdict therefore infringes on his First Amendment rights to free speech. Singer also contends he should have received a new trial because the court improperly instructed the jury about Iski’s burden of proof; because there was an erroneous evidentiary ruling; and because the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent. Finally, he alleges there are errors in the Journal Entry of Judgment that require correction. We agree the court erred by awarding Steidley and Iski prejudgment interest; post judgment interest was recalculated based on the erroneous inclusion of prejudgment interest. We otherwise identify no errors of law or abuses of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify in part.