Dispositions Other Than By Published Opinion | Feb. 19, 2025
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
Division I
Division II
121,463 – Mark Farris and JoLana Farris, Plaintiffs/Appellants, vs. Preston W. Masquelier and Cindy Masquelier, Defendants/Appellees. Appeal from Order of the District Court of Custer County, Hon. Jill Weeden, Trial Judge. Mark and JoLana Farris appeal the district court’s award of $341,876.56 in attorney fees and costs to Preston and Candy Masquelier after the Masqueliers successfully defended a lawsuit brought by the Farrises. On review, we find no error in the court’s fee decision and thus affirm. AFFIRMED. Opinion from the Court of Civil Appeals, Division II by BLACKWELL, J.; FISCHER, J., and WISEMAN, P.J. concur. February 13, 2025
Division III
121,680 – Boston Avenue Reality, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Mazzio’s LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company, Defendant/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Honorable Daman Cantrell, Trial Judge. Plaintiff/Appellant, Boston Avenue Realty, LLC (BAR), appeals from the trial court’s order disqualifying BAR’s counsel from representing BAR in its breach of contract action against Defendant/Appellee, Mazzio’s LLC. BAR is a limited liability company that owns real estate. The members of BAR include property manager Joseph L. Hull, IV (Hull Junior) and his father, legal counsel Joseph L. Hull, III (Hull Senior). In 2013, BAR purchased real property in which Mazzio’s held a leasehold estate. For approximately four years, the two parties engaged in discussions regarding Mazzio’s intent to downsize its leasehold. In August 2021, BAR sued Mazzio’s for breach of their lease. Mazzio’s filed counterclaims for declaratory judgment and an accounting. Thereafter, Mazzio’s moved to disqualify Hull Senior from representing BAR in the underlying lawsuit. Mazzio’s claimed Hull Senior was going to be a “necessary witness” at the time of trial and therefore cannot also serve as BAR’s advocate pursuant to Rule 3.7(a) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC), 5 O.S. 2021, Ch. 1, App. 3A. Mazzio’s argument was primarily based on the facts that Hull Senior (1) was copied on most of the email negotiations between the parties and (2) was the only BAR representative to attend the last in-person meeting of the parties. BAR objected to the motion, asserting Hull Junior did all of the accounting, research and drafting of the terms and proposals sent to Mazzio’s, and he drafted all but three or four of BAR’s email communications with Mazzio’s. BAR argued that Hull Junior, not Hull Senior, was the only “necessary witness” required of BAR. The trial court issued an order granting the motion to disqualify Hull Senior, effective immediately. Specifically, the trial court held, “Mr. Hull III is intimately involved in the factual issues in this case such that the high bar of disqualification is met.” It is unclear what standard the trial court applied and, other than that single sentence, the order does not contain any specific findings of fact regarding the necessity of Hull Senior’s testimony at trial. In light of the order’s lack of specificity, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. We also hold that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a Rule 3.7 order disqualifying an attorney from serving as a trial advocate does not operate to prohibit the lawyer from representing his/her client in pretrial proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion by BELL, C.J.; DOWNING, P.J., and MITCHELL, J., concur. February 14, 2025
121,796 – Ellen Odella Risk, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Susan Jane Harrison, Defendant/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Honorable Loretta Radford, Trial Judge. Defendant/Appellant Susan Jane Harrison (Janey) appeals from a protective order entered in favor of her sister, Petitioner/Appellee Ellen Odella Risk (Ellen). The parties each filed petitions for protective orders after a confrontation concerning their mother’s cremated remains. We find the court abused its discretion by awarding Ellen a final order of protection. Under the facts of this case, Janey’s failure to disclose the location of their mother’s ashes does not meet the definition of harassment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we REVERSE AND REMAND with instructions to vacate the protective order against Janey. Opinion by MITCHELL, J.; DOWNING, P.J., concurs and BELL, C.J., concurs specially. February 14, 2025
Division IV