Dispositions Other Than By Published Opinion | March 9, 2022

Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals

Division I

120,041         –    In the matter of the Estate of: Darrel E. Hendrick, Deceased, Michelle Schonholtz, Appellant, v. TTCU Federal Credit Union, Creditor/Appellee, and Catherine Curtin, Special Administrator of the Estate of Darrell E. Hendrick, Deceased, Appellee.  Appeal from the District Court of Wagoner County, Oklahoma.  Honorable Dennis N. Shook, Trial Judge.  This appeal originates from a Wagoner County District Court probate proceeding.   Appellant, Michelle Schonholtz, the pay-on-death (POD) beneficiary of a credit union account (the “S-1 Account”) owned by Darrell E. Hendrick, deceased (Decedent) and located at Creditor/Appellee, TTCU Federal Credit Union (TTCU), appeals from the probate court’s journal entry of judgment granting summary judgment to TTCU.  During Decedent’s lifetime, TTCU loaned $150,000.00 to Decedent to purchase real property in Wagoner County.  TTCU obtained a purchase money mortgage on the real property.  Decedent’s POD membership account agreement granted TTCU a security interest in the S-1 Account and a right to setoff the S-1 Account funds against any debt owed by Decedent to TTCU.  After Decedent’s death, TTCU filed a creditor’s claim against the estate for $116,864.74 – the balance due on the mortgage note.  This claim was accepted and approved by the probate court.  The probate court entered an order, filed March 6, 2018, which held pursuant to 6 O.S. 2011 §2025(A)(2) and the account agreement, TTCU had a valid security interest in the Decedent’s S-1 Account, and TTCU had the right to setoff the S-1 Account funds against the mortgage debt.  The mortgaged property was sold during the probate and the sales proceeds were placed in escrow.  The probate court’s journal entry filed July 11, 2018, reaffirmed its earlier ruling and denied Appellant’s motion for new trial.  The August 12, 2021, judgment, which is the subject of this appeal, reaffirmed the 2018 judgments, granted TTCU a right to offset the S-1 Account funds to satisfy the mortgage debt, and authorized and directed TTCU to effect the offset.  We hold the probate court did not err when it determined TTCU is authorized to offset the S-1 Account funds to satisfy the mortgage debt.  However, the probate court erred and held contrary to law when it prioritized and directed TTCU to offset the S-1 Account to satisfy the mortgage debt, before exhausting the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property.  The judgment filed August 13, 2021, is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.  On remand, the probate court shall order the special administrator to apply the escrowed proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property towards the mortgage debt.  58 O.S. 2011 §485. Thereafter, the probate court may direct TTCU to offset the S-1 Account funds against any remaining indebtedness due from Decedent to TTCU.  Opinion by BELL; P.J.; GOREE, J., and MITCHELL, V.C.J., concur. – March 3, 2022


Division II


Division III

119,394                 –        William D. Lunn, individually and as parent, next friend, and Personal Representative of: Estate of Kathrine Lillian Lunn, Estate of Adrienne Badeen Lunn, and Estate of Michael Dixon Lunn, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Counter‑Appellants, vs. Continental Motors, Inc., f/k/a Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., Defendant/Appellant/Counter‑Appellee, and Beech Aircraft Corporation, Raytheon Company, Raytheon Corporation, Raytheon Aircraft Company, Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., Teledyne, Inc., Pete Pittenger, Gary Clayton Sipes, Sipes Aircraft Sales, LLC, and Tulsa Towbot, LLC., Defendants. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.  Honorable Caroline Wall, Trial Judge. Plaintiff/Appellee/Counter‑Appellant William D. Lunn filed this action following a plane crash in which Lunn’s minor children were killed. The plane’s engine was remanufactured by Defendant/Appellant/Counter‑Appellee Continental Motors, Inc. (Continental). Lunn argued the engine was defectively designed because it did not protect against the potential for contamination caused by an incorrectly installed fuel strainer outside the engine. After the jury found in favor of Continental, Lunn filed a Motion for JNOV or alternatively, Motion for New Trial. Three years later, the court granted a new trial.  Continental argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial, challenges the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, and asserts Lunn’s claims against it were barred by a statute of repose applicable to general aviation.  Lunn also appeals the grant of a new trial. The trial court properly found it had specific personal jurisdiction over Continental in this case. Nevertheless, the record shows Lunn’s claims against Continental were barred by the statute of repose. The engine had been rebuilt within the repose period, but the engine was not new and therefore under the terms of the statute, the repose period did not roll forward as a matter of law. We therefore REVERSE the order granting a new trial and direct that Lunn’s action against Continental be dismissed.  Although reversal is required because the repose period barred any claim related to the engine, we also note the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial more than three years after the jury trial based on alleged misconduct known during or immediately following trial. Opinion by SWINTON, J.; PRINCE, P.J., and GOREE, J. (sitting by designation), concur. – March 4, 2022

119,556                 –        In re the Marriage of: John Mahaffey, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Patricia Mahaffey, Respondent/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.  Honorable Rodney Sparkman, Trial Judge. Respondent/Appellant, Patricia Mahaffey (“Appellant” or “Patricia”), and Petitioner/Appellee, John Mahaffey (“Appellee” or “John”), were divorced by an Agreed Decree of Dissolution of Marriage.  Patricia was awarded the marital home contingent upon refinancing the home into her own name within 180 days of the entry of the Decree.  The Decree provided that, in the event Patricia failed to refinance the home, it was to be placed on the market and sold.  Because Patricia did not refinance the home in a timely manner, John filed a Motion to Compel Listing and Sale of Real Estate.  Following a non‑jury trial, the trial court ordered the Parties to list the home for sale and the proceeds or deficit from the sale be divided in accordance with the terms of the Decree.  In accordance with the deference we are obligated to extend to the trial court in the face of contested issues of fact we necessarily find that the decision of the trial court was not against the clear weight of the evidence.  Also, finding no error of law, we AFFIRM the trial court’s Order of April 28, 2021.  Opinion by PRINCE, P.J.; MITCHELL, V.C.J., and SWINTON, J., concur. – March 4, 2022

119,930                 –        Paula Calava, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Jeffery Calava, Defendant/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.  Honorable Douglas E. Drummond, Trial Judge. This case involves an alleged breach of an antenuptial agreement between Appellant Jeffery Calava (“Husband”) and Appellee Paula Calava (“Wife”).  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wife on her claim of breach of contract.  The trial court denied Husband’s competing motion.  He now appeals.  After de novo review, we conclude that the issue of whether the remedy of specific performance was an available to Wife is moot for purposes of this appeal because the breach of contract and specific performance claims were plead as alternative claims and were clearly treated as such by the trial court; that Wife timely filed her initial complaint; and, that the antenuptial agreement was a valid alternative contract.  Thus, we AFFIRM the trial court’s September 20, 2021 Order that granted summary judgment to Wife on her breach of contract claim and denied Husband’s competing motion for summary judgment. Opinion by PRINCE, P.J.; MITCHELL, V.C.J., and SWINTON, J., concur. – March 4, 2022

120,126                 –        Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in its Capacity as Indenture Trustee for the Noteholder of Aames Mortgage Investment Trust 2005-2, a Deleware Statutory Trust, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. John B. Bersin, Defendant/Appellant, and Amanda Bersin; John Doe, Occupant; Aames Funding Corporation d/b/a Aames Home Loan; Citibank, N.A., as Trustee for Saco Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series; Security Bank, Midfirst Bank, N.A.; PSS World Medical, Inc.; ONB Bank and Trust Company; Mill Creek Lumber & Supply Company; and Mill Creek Carpet & Tile Company, Defendants. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.  Honorable William J. Musseman, Trial Judge. In this mortgage foreclosure proceeding, Defendant/Appellant John B. Bersin (Owner) seeks review of an order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Deutche Bank National Trust Company (Bank).  On appeal, Owner claims there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning Bank’s standing to sue on the promissory note and that Bank’s support for its motion for summary judgment is deficient.  After de novo review, we find no genuine issue of material fact and AFFIRM the trial court’s order. Opinion by MITCHELL, V.C.J.; PRINCE, P.J., and SWINTON, J., concur. – March 4, 2022


Division IV

119,279 — In re the Marriage of:  Amy L. Darter, Petitioner/Appellant, vs.
James M. Darter, Respondent/Appellee.  Appeal from an Order of the District Court of Oklahoma County, Hon. Barry L. Hafar, Trial Judge.  Amy L. Darter (Wife) appeals the trial court’s Decree of Dissolution of Marriage.  The issues on appeal are limited to the trial court’s valuation of two business entities formed during the marriage:  CCW Safe, LLC (CCW) and AAA Sisters (AAA).  Both parties presented expert testimony regarding the values of the entities.  The trial court has considerable discretion in valuing marital property, and Wife’s arguments fail to convince us that an abuse of discretion occurred.  Accordingly, we find the trial court’s valuation of CCW and AAA was not an abuse of discretion, and we affirm the Decree.  AFFIRMED.  Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, by HIXON, J.; FISCHER, C.J., and BARNES, P.J., concur. – March 1, 2022