Dispositions Other Than By Published Opinion | Nov. 11, 2026
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
Division I
123,674 – Briana Brakefield, now Willis, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Matthew Brakefield, Respondent/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Mayes County, Oklahoma. Honorable Andrew Meloy, Trial Judge.Respondent/Appellant Matthew Brakefield (Father) appeals from an order entered November 26, 2025 that modifies custody, visitation, and child support and directs him to pay the attorney’s fees of Petitioner/Appellee Briana Brakefield (now Willis) (Mother). The order reflects an agreed settlement the parties announced at a hearing held August 8, 2025. Father argues, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in how it conducted the proceedings, including the hearing on August 8, 2025, and by entering the order. We affirm. Opinion by SWINTON, P.J.; GOREE, J., concurs and BELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. Nov. 9, 2026
123,927 – In the Matter of I.A., Alleged Deprived Child, Peyshia Ayres and Ian William Ayres, Appellant, v. State of Oklahoma, Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County, Oklahoma. Honorable Kim Conyers, Trial Judge. Competent evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the state proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that I.A. is a deprived child. Opinion by GOREE, J., SWINTON, P.J., and BELL, J., concur. Nov. 10, 2026
123,702 – Shawn Ford, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Justin Jernigan and Mary Jernigan, Defendants/Appellants. Appeal from the District Court of Mayes County, Honorable Shawn S. Taylor, Judge. Defendants/Appellants, Justin and Mary Jernigan, appeal from the trial court’s judgment quieting title to approximately seven (7) acres of rural property in Plaintiff/Appellee, Shawn Ford. After a non-jury trial, the trial court rejected Defendants’ claims of adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence. The disputed tract is located between Plaintiff’s property on the north and Defendants’ property on the south. A fence that has existed for more than three quarters of a century denotes the northern edge of the tract at issue; the southern edge is the east-west survey line between the parties’ properties. The two parties obtained their respective tracts from grandchildren of Claud Ragsdale, who originally owned 160 acres. Commencing in the 1940’s, Claud conveyed his property over a period of years to various family members. The record reveals the fence was built prior to 1940 or soon thereafter. There is no evidence as to why the fence was erected in its present location. However, both of the parties’ predecessors testified the fence was always treated and recognized as the boundary line between the northern and southern properties. We conclude the clear weight of the evidence shows that the fifteen year statutory period required to establish boundary by acquiescence was met before Plaintiff and Defendants purchased their respective properties. Plaintiff is therefore precluded from asserting that the fence is not the true property line. The judgment is reversed and this cause is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion by BELL, J.; SWINTON, P.J., and GOREE, J., concur. Nov. 10, 2026
Division II
Division III
122,936 – Express Ranches, Inc., Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Civic Energy Corporation; Golden Phoenix Recovery, LLC, and Bruce Scambler, Defendants/Appellants, and Sooner Energy Plus, LLC, JMEKS Inc., Jonna D. Scambler as trustee of the JDKS Revocable Trust, Defendants. Appeal from the District Court of Logan County, Oklahoma. Honorable Louis A. Duel, Trial Judge. Appellants, Civic Energy Corporation, Golden Phoenix Recovery, LLC, and Bruce Scambler, appeal the trial court’s Journal Entry of Default Judgment (Default Judgment), Journal Entry Awarding Damages, Costs and Attorneys Fees Pursuant to July 11, 2023 Default Judgment, and Journal Entry denying Appellants’ separate motions for new trial. A review of the record shows no preserved reversible error of law and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, we summarily AFFIRM the orders appealed pursuant to Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.202(e), 12 O.S.2021, Ch. 15, App.1. Opinion by DOWNING, P.J.; MITCHELL, J., and BELL, J. (sitting by designation), concur.Nov. 4, 2026
123,299 – Charley Macy and Charley’s Trucking, LLC, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Nicolas Martinez Lopez, Defendant/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Honorable Anthony L. Bonner, Trial Judge. Plaintiffs/Appellants, Charley Macy and Charley’s Trucking, LLC (collectively “Macy”), filed a Petition seeking recission of a contract to sell real property. Attorney for Macy, James S. Matthews, Jr. (“Matthews”), appeals an Order sanctioning him in the amount of $4,050.00 for filing a third motion to disqualify the trial court judge. The trial court determined the third motion was filed solely to delay the proceedings. Matthews argues his motions were meritorious and that the record did not support the finding made by the trial court. Based on our review of the appellate record, there is no error in the award of sanctions by the trial court under 12 O.S. § 2011(C). We, accordingly, AFFIRM the Order of the trial court. Opinion by PRINCE, V.C.J.; DOWNING, P.J., and MITCHELL, J., concur. Nov. 4, 2026
123,742 – Brooke Hamilton, Claudia Hamilton, & Nameplates, Inc., Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Candace Conley, Defendant/Appellant, and Elizabeth Trombka, and Merrin Trombka, Appellants. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Honorable Kevin Gray, Trial Judge. Before the Court of Civil Appeals was the district court’s order denying a motion to appoint a receiver over Nameplates, Inc., a closely held commercial printing business. Appellants collectively owned half of the corporation, while Appellees owned the other half and controlled its board and management. Appellants alleged that the Appellees had diverted corporate funds through insider loans, excessive compensation, and payment of personal expenses, and sought a receiver to protect corporate assets during the proceedings. On appeal, Appellants principally argued that the district court had improperly treated the corporation’s solvency as dispositive. This Court concluded that the district court had considered additional grounds beyond solvency supporting its decision in accordance with its equitable authority to appoint receivers over solvent corporations. The Court further upheld the district court’s findings that Appellants had failed to show irreparable harm and Appellants’ probability of prevailing. Alleged past diversions could be remedied through damages and an accounting, and concerns about collecting a judgment did not establish irreparable harm. Although threatened ongoing dissipation could warrant relief, testimony concerning the corporation’s stability, profitability, and debt reduction supported the finding that its assets were not in imminent danger of waste. Competing evidence and business explanations likewise supported the finding that Appellants had not clearly shown a strong probability of prevailing. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court affirmed. AFFIRMED. Opinion by MITCHELL, J.; DOWNING, P.J., and PRINCE, V.C.J., concur. Nov. 4, 2026
123,620 – David M. Garrett, an individual, and Garrett Law Office, A Professional Corporation, an Oklahoma limited liability company, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Richard A Bell, an individual, and The Bell Law Firm, LPPC, A Professional Corporation, Defendants/Appellees. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Honorable Daman H. Cantrell, Trial Judge. Before the Court of Civil Appeals was an appeal by David M. Garrett and Garrett Law Office (collectively, “Appellants”) challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Richard A Bell and the Bell Law Firm (collectively, “Appellees”) on claims arising from a fee-sharing agreement involving workers’ compensation cases. Under the parties’ 2005 agreement, Appellants referred cases to Appellees in exchange for a percentage of the attorney fees recovered. After disputes arose concerning allegedly unpaid fees, Appellants filed suit and ultimately identified 166 cases for which they claimed additional compensation. Eighteen of those cases were resolved through an earlier summary judgment, leaving 148 cases in dispute. Appellees obtained summary judgment on the remaining claims by arguing that Appellants lacked sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of their causes of action. This Court REVERSED AND REMANDED, holding that Appellees failed to satisfy their initial burden under 12 O.S. § 2056 and District Court Rule 13. Although Appellees identified several undisputed facts concerning the parties’ relationship and payment history, those facts did not establish that Appellees had fulfilled their obligations or negate an essential element of Appellants’ claims. The Court explained that a defendant cannot shift the summary-judgment burden merely by asserting that the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prevail at trial. Because Appellees failed to make the requisite initial evidentiary showing, Appellants were not obligated to establish the merits of their claims in response, and summary judgment was improper. Opinion by MITCHELL, J.; HIXON, C.J. (sitting by designation), and BLACKWELL, J. (sitting by designation), concur.
Division IV
123,903 – Gwynnco Property Investments, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. Kenneth E. Richardson III, et al., Defendants/Appellants. Proceeding to review an Order of the District Court of Muskogee County, Hon. Timothy King, District Judge. Kenneth E. Richerson appeals from the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of GwynnCo Property Investments, LLC (GwynnCo), and the court’s grant of GwynnCo’s attorney fees. Upon careful review, we find that GwynnCo has not demonstrated it is the party entitled to enforce the note; therefore, it is not entitled to foreclose on the property. Thus, the order granting summary judgment and the related fee order are reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion from the Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV by BLACKWELL, P.J.; BARNES, J., and HUBER, J., concur. Nov. 4, 2026