Dispositions Other Than By Published Opinion | Nov. 8, 2023
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
Division I
Division II
120,757 – 4 Star General Contracting, LLC, Petitioner/Appellant, vs. Oklahoma Department of Labor and Jennifer Clayton, Respondents/Appellees. Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Hon. C. Brent Dishman, Trial Judge. 4 Star General Contracting, LLC appeals the district court’s order affirming two Oklahoma Department of Labor Final Agency Determinations, awarding Jennifer Clayton unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and an attorney’s fee. Based on our review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm the order under review. AFFIRMED. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, by HIXON, J.; BARNES, V.C.J., and WISEMAN, P.J., concur. Nov. 7, 2023
Division III
120,924 – RCA Land, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company; and RSA Land, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. 145th Land Development, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company; Lloyd Robson, an individual, Defendants/Appellants, and I244-Admiral Land, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company; and Coalbent, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company, Defendants. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Honorable Caroline Wall, Trial Judge. This appeal involves the propriety of the trial court’s grant of declaratory and injunctive relief to two members of a limited liability company against the third member regarding the proposed sale of real property, the company’s sole asset. Plaintiffs are two members of I244‑Admiral Land, LLC (Company). Defendants are the third member of Company, 145TH Land Development, LLC, and its owner, Lloyd Robson. Company is owned in equal shares by the three entities. Company’s sole asset is approximately 153 acres of Tulsa County land. Company is governed by an Operating Agreement, which requires that most actions of Company must have the approval of all three members. However, there is an exception to this rule that allows any member who wants to accept a written offer to purchase land owned by Company ‑ and who receives the “consent” of Company’s lender ‑ to give written notice to the other members of their “Purchase Right.” Pursuant to Section 5.1(i) of the Operating Agreement, such notice triggers a fourteen (14) day period within which the other member(s) must either agree to buy the land on the proposed terms or be deemed to have approved the sale. RCA’s owner gave 145TH Land notice that both RCA and RSA wanted to accept a written contract from another entity to buy Company’s land for $8,000,000.00. On the same day, RCA emailed an officer at Company’s lender asking him to “acknowledge your consent that this sale will allow the partnership to satisfy the outstanding . . . loan balance in full.” The balance of Company’s note and mortgage with their lender was then about $2,100,000.00. Rather than respond to RCA’s communication, Robson and his wife immediately purchased Company’s note and mortgage from the lender through another of their businesses, Coalbent, LLC. The Robsons, acting through Coalbent, thereafter refused to give Plaintiffs consent to sell the property. Plaintiffs commenced the instant action against Robson, 145TH Land, Company and Coalbent for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with a contract. Plaintiffs also requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the trial court held: the Operating Agreement governs the parties and their obligations in this matter; the proposed sales contract is valid and enforceable; the letter to 145TH Land complied with Section 5.1(i) and started the fourteen (14) day Purchase Right period; and the failure of 145TH Land to purchase the land within that period resulted in its deemed approval of the sale. To the extent the Operating Agreement required the consent of the lender, the trial court held such was prevented by 145TH Land and Robson, acting through Coalbent. The trial court concluded Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance under the Operating Agreement, 145TH Land is deemed to have approved of the sale, and Collett may effectuate the sale of the property without the need for any further consent or action from Robson. To the extent the trial court’s order granted injunctive relief, that portion of the order is reversed. The instant record is devoid of any evidence that the contemplated injury to Plaintiffs cannot be fully compensated in money damages. However, we hold the trial court correctly concluded, pursuant to its declaratory judgment, that Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance under the Operating Agreement, 145TH Land is deemed to have approved of the sale, and Collett may effectuate the sale of the property without any interference from Robson. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. Opinion by BELL, J.; MITCHELL, C.J., and PRINCE, P.J., CONCUR. November 03, 2023
121,303 – Jerry Livingston, individually and as next of kin of Sherry Livingston, Deceased, and as parent and next friend of J.L., a minor child, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Saint Francis Health System, Inc., Saint Francis Hospital, Inc., Defendants/Appellees, Neurological Specialists, and Daniel J. Boedeker, M.D., Defendants. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Honorable Doug E. Drummond, Trial Judge. Plaintiffs/Appellants, Jerry Livingston, both individually and as next of kin of Sherry Livingston, deceased, and as parent and next friend of J.L., a minor child (“Livingstons”), appeal the granting of summary judgment in this medical malpractice case. Livingstons sued the Defendants/Appellees, Saint Francis Health System, Inc., and Saint Francis Hospital, Inc. (collectively “SFH”), after Sherry Livingston suffered an infection after a brain surgery, which Livingstons claim ultimately resulted in her death. Livingstons asserted claims for negligence/wrongful death. Livingstons alleged that the elements for the evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were present and they sought damages for loss of companionship and consortium. SFH was granted summary judgment after the trial court determined that the opinions reached by Livingstons’ expert witness were conclusory in nature and after it determined that Livingstons failed to meet the elements for res ipsa loquitur. We find that the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability and the issue regarding the failure to diagnose/treatment claims. We further find, however, that the trial court committed error when granting summary judgment on the remaining negligence claim and, therefore, the matter is AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Opinion by PRINCE, P.J.; MITCHELL, C.J., and BELL, J., CONCUR. November 03, 2023
Division IV