Dispositions Other Than By Published Opinion | Oct. 15, 2025
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
Division I
122,961 – Johnson Electric, LLC, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, vs. W.L. McNatt & Company, Defendant/Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. Jeremy Johnson d/b/a Johnson Electric, Third-Party Defendant/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Seminole County, Oklahoma. Honorable Trisha D. Smith, Trial Judge. This appeal addresses a garnishment in an action where the rights of all the parties have not yet been fully determined. The district court’s order and court minute referencing 12 O.S. §994 did not create a judgment because the undetermined issues are intertwined with those which have been adjudicated. The order denying the motion to quash the garnishment is REVERSED. Opinion by PRINCE, P.J.; GOREE, P.J., and MITCHELL, J. (sitting by designation), CONCUR. Oct. 10, 2025
123,239 – Billy Clinkenbeard, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. Jack E. Weaver, M.D., Jack E. Weaver, M.D., P.C. and Muskogee Bone & Joint Clinic, PLLC, Defendants/Appellees. Appeal from the District Court of Muskogee County, Oklahoma. Honorable Bret Smith, Trial Judge. This appeal challenges the award of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants/Appellees, Jack E. Weaver, M.D., Jack E. Weaver, M.D., P.C., and Muskogee Bone & Joint Clinic, PLLC (collectively referred to as “Weaver”). The critical facts here are that the Plaintiff, Billy Clinkenbeard, had initiated a previous action against Weaver, but dismissed that action. Approximately seven months prior to the time the Petition in this action was filed, Clinkenbeard passed away. Weaver moved for summary judgment and claimed that this case is a nullity because Clinkenbeard’s attorney had no authority to file this action after Clinkenbeard passed away. Following the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Clinkenbeard’s surviving spouse, Paula Clinkenbeard, filed a Suggestion of Death and a Motion for Substitution of Party. The trial court agreed with Weaver, denied the Motion for Substitution of Party, and granted summary judgment for Weaver. This appeal followed and, during the pendency of this appeal, Weaver filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal. We have reviewed the record and applicable law and REVERSE the Journal Entry of Judgment AND REMAND the matter for a determination as to whether Paula Clinkenbeard has been appointed as the Special Administrator for Clinkenbeard’s estate and, if so, the date of said appointment. Upon remand, in the event the trial court determines that Paula Clinkenbeard had been, in fact, appointed as the Special Administrator prior to entry of the appealable order (i.e., June 6, 2025), then the trial court is directed to allow the substitution of parties, pursuant to 12 O.S. § 2017(A). On the other hand, in the event the trial court determines upon remand that Paula Clinkenbeard had not been, in fact, appointed as the Special Administrator prior to entry of the appealable order, then the trial court is directed to dismiss the action with prejudice. Opinion by PRINCE, P.J.; GOREE, P.J., and MITCHELL, J. (sitting by designation), CONCUR. Oct. 10, 2025
123,373 – James D. Knight, Allen S. Robinson and Lisa T. Almond, Plaintiffs/Appellants, vs. City of Jenks, Brandon Macy and Teresa Nowlin, Defendants/Appellees, and Arthur Duane Phillips, Intervening Defendant/Appellee.Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Honorable Tracy Priddy, Trial Judge. This appeal addresses the meaning of 11 O.S. § 14-103, and whether it requires a detailed description of facts or reasons in an emergency clause when adopted by a municipality in connection with an ordinance and whether such action may be taken to avoid an opportunity for challenge through the referendum process. The Appellants, James D. Knight, Allen S. Robinson, and Lisa T. Almond (collectively referred to as “Knight”) appeal the trial court’s Order of July 23, 2025, sustaining a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Appellees, consisting of the Intervenor, Arthur Duane Phillips, and the Defendants, the City of Jenks, the Jenks City Clerk, Brandon Macy, and the Jenks City Attorney, Teresa Nowlin (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). We hold that the trial court did not err in granting the Motion to Dismiss and, accordingly, AFFIRM the trial court’s Order. Opinion by PRINCE, P.J.; GOREE, P.J., and MITCHELL, J. (sitting by designation), CONCUR. Oct. 10, 2025
Division II
Division III
123,068 – Estate of Deborah Kay Simmons, Jason Lee Simmons, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Christopher K. Kollmansberger, Defendant/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Bryan County, Oklahoma. Honorable Mark R. Campbell, Trial Judge. In this action for foreclosure, quiet title and to set aside void tax deed, Plaintiff/Appellant, Jason Lee Simmons, as personal representative of the Estate of Deborah Kay Simmons, deceased (Seller), appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant/Appellee, Christopher K. Kollmansberger (Purchaser). Purchaser acquired title to the real property through an ad valorem tax resale. Seller sought to foreclose on a recorded contract for deed by and between decedent and Purchaser’s predecessor-in-title and to quiet title to the real property. After de novo review of the record, this Court REVERSES the trial court’s judgment in favor of Purchaser and REMANDS this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Opinion by BELL, C.J.; DOWNING, P.J., and MITCHELL, J., concur. Oct. 10, 2025
123,313 – Hayes Chiropractic Health Clinic, P.C., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Kenneth G. Erickson, D.C., Defendant/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of McCurtin County, Oklahoma. Honorable Emily Maxwell, Trial Judge. Hayes Chiropractic Health Clinic, P.C. (Hayes) appeals from the trial court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Order). Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we find the Order was not error. Accordingly, we AFFIRM. Opinion by DOWNING, P.J.; BELL, C.J., and MITCHELL, J., concur. Oct. 10, 2025
Division IV
121,852 – Ladona Grace Rushing, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Rebecca Plummer, Jack Plummer, Jacob Massey, and Aubrey Massey, Defendants/Appellees, and Robert Rushing and Donna Rushing, Defendants. In this breach of contract and quiet title action, Ladona Grace Rushing appeals from the district court’s “Judgment following Non-Jury Trial (Including Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law)” (Judgment) in which, among other things, the court determined Ms. Rushing failed to prove any legal right or title to the property that is the subject of this lawsuit and, therefore, found she was not entitled to having title to the subject property quieted in her name, and finding a prior mortgage was a lien on the property and denying her claim to quiet title against the lien holders. The trial court erred in finding a residential lease with option to purchase executed between Ms. Rushing and Rebecca Plummer and Jack Plummer was ambiguous and in interpreting the contract without reference to its express terms. Pursuant to the contract’s terms, Ms. Rushing exercised her option to purchase the subject property through payment of a down payment. Having exercised the option, the contract to purchase was accepted. Thereafter, Ms. Rushing, as per the contract terms, paid the monthly payment, a payment that expressly included homeowners insurance and taxes. Ms. Rushing, per the contract terms, accepted the sale of the property in as-is condition and made significant repairs to the property. Ms. Rushing made all the monthly payments within the ten-year contract term. Consequently, Ms. Rushing is the owner of the property per the terms of the contract, and the trial court erred in finding the Plummers were the owners of the property and quieting title in them. The court, thus, also erred in granting the Plummers’ action for ejectment and awarding attorney fees to them. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the Judgment denying Ms. Rushing’s quiet title action against the Plummers and finding she had no right, title or interest in the property, and in granting the Plummers’ quiet title action against Ms. Rushing and granting their claim for ejectment against her. We remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s Opinion. We further conclude that part of the trial court’s Judgment denying Ms. Rushing’s quiet title action against Jacob Massey and Aubrey Massey and in determining they have a mortgage lien on the property has not been shown to be in error. Accordingly, we affirm the Judgment as to the Masseys. REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, by BARNES, P.J.; HIXON, V.C.J., and HUBER, J., concur. Oct. 10, 2025
122,652 – Brenda Duverney-Chappell, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Greg Halko, Defendant/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Hon. Natalie Mai, Trial Judge. Greg Halko appeals from an order of the district court finding, among other things, that his motion to dismiss – filed pursuant to the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act, 12 O.S. 2021 §§ 1430-1440 (OCPA) – was deemed denied by operation of law on September 25, 2023. We agree that Halko’s OCPA motion to dismiss must be deemed to have been denied by operation of law on that date. Because no appeal was timely made, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, by BARNES, P.J.; HIXON, V.C.J., and HUBER, J., concur. Oct. 10, 2025
122,256 – In re the Marriage of: Christy Nicole Nixon, Petitioner, vs. William Kyle Lopez, Respondent/Appellee, and Rob B. Hopkins, Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County, Hon. Thad Balkman, Trial Judge. Attorney Rob B. Hopkins (Hopkins) appeals an award of attorney’s fees entered in a divorce proceeding between client Christy Nicole Nixon (Wife) and William Kyle Lopez (Husband). The trial court entered an award of fees directly against Hopkins for conduct which the trial court determined unnecessarily complicated and delayed proceedings and made them needlessly vexatious. On review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s award pursuant to its inherent authority to sanction vexatious conduct and reject Hopkins’ propositions of error in their entirety and find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to vacate the award. AFFIRMED. Substitute Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, HIXON, V.C.J.; BARNES, P.J., and HUBER, J., concur. Oct. 14, 2025