Dispositions Other Than By Published Opinion | Oct. 7, 2026
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
Division I
124,006 – Curtis Lee Enterprises, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Carolyn McGee, Eric Bomar, Debra Bomar, Esther Prater, Craig Hilliard and The State of Oklahoma ex rel. The Department of Transportation, and David Whitlock, Diana Whitlock, Jimmy Page Family Limited Partnership, Baron Burgess Administrator of the Estate of Barry Don Burgess, Durrie L. Caldwell, Atkinson Living Trust Dated April 5, 2011, Odom Sidney Shawn, Johnson Family Limited Partnership No. One, Billy Mayfield McCraw II, Defendants, and Big River Ranch, LLC, Defendant/Appellee. Appellee from the District Court of Bryan County, Oklahoma. Honorable Mark Campbell, Trial Judge. The order dismissing Appellant’s claim against Appellee, Big River Ranch, LLC, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is reversed because the trial court improperly adjudicated a factual dispute relating to jurisdiction which was intertwined with the merits of Appellant’s quiet title action. Opinion by GOREE, J.; SWINTON, P.J., and BELL, J., concur. Oct. 2, 2026
123,946 – First Bank & Trust Co., an Oklahoma Banking Institution, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Norman Hospitality, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation; Lawton Hospitality LP, an Oklahoma Limited Partnership; Premier Hospitality Management, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation; Comanche Hotels, Incorporated aka Comanche Hotels, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation; Rajendra K. Patel, an individual, Defendants/Appellants. Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County. Honorable Jeff Virgin, Judge. Defendants/Appellants, Norman Hospitality, Inc., Lawton Hospitality, LP, Premier Hospitality Management, Inc., Comanche Hotels, Incorporated, and Rajendra K. Patel, appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee, First Bank and Trust Co., in Bank’s action to foreclose the mortgages on two hotels. This case concerns two hotels owned by Patel: an operational hotel in Lawton and a non-operational hotel in Norman that was undergoing renovations. In 2021, Defendants borrowed money from Bank and executed a series of cross-collateralized promissory notes, mortgages and security agreements in favor of Bank. The notes were secured by mortgages on the two hotel properties. Defendants subsequently failed to make payments when due and defaulted on the Norman note. Bank filed the instant action in May 2025 to collect on the notes and foreclose the mortgages. Bank thereafter moved for summary judgment. On Defendants’ motion, the trial court granted additional time for discovery. In February 2026, Bank reurged its summary judgment motion, noting inter alia that the guarantor for the notes, mortgages and security agreements admitted the Norman note was in default. Defendants objected and requested additional discovery. The trial court denied the request for additional discovery and granted both in rem and in personam against Defendants in the amount of $14,410,255.87 plus attorney fees and costs. Defendants appeal and contend the trial court erred by granting summary judgment without allowing them sufficient time for discovery. Both District Court Rule 13(d) and 12 O.S. 2021 §2056 give trial courts discretion to order discovery before granting summary judgment. We hold Defendants have failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a second continuance. The court had already granted one continuance for Defendants to conduct discovery and Defendants did not file a motion to compel pursuant to 12 O.S. 2021 §3237. More importantly, Defendants’ guarantor admitted during a hearing that the Norman note was in default. None of Defendants’ alleged disputed facts were material to the issue of whether they defaulted on the Norman note. Upon de novo review of the instant record, we hold there exists no genuine controversy as to any material fact and that Bank is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. AFFIRMED. Opinion by BELL, J.; SWINTON, P.J., and GOREE, J., concur. Oct. 2, 2026
123,506 – George Seper, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Senovia Seper, Respondent/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma. Honorable Emily J. Mueller, Trial Judge. In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Petitioner/Appellant, George Seper (Husband) appeals from the trial court’s decree of dissolution of marriage. Husband claims the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Respondent/Appellee, Senovia Seper (Wife) thirty-six thousand dollars ($36,000.00) in support alimony; when it ordered the marital home to be sold and the net sale proceeds be equally divided; and when it required Husband to carry health insurance for Wife. After reviewing the record, this Court cannot find the trial court abused its discretion or held contrary to the evidence and affirms. Opinion by BELL, J.; SWINTON, P.J., and GOREE, J., concur. Oct. 5, 2026
123,853 – In the Matter of: K.C. and P.W., Alleged Deprived Children, Audria Lynn Waddle, Appellant, v. State of Oklahoma, Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Honorable Nichole M. Gillett, Trial Judge Appellant, Audria Waddle (Mother) the biological mother of K.C., a minor child born January 2017, and P.W., a minor child born October 2024, appeals from the trial court’s order entered upon a jury’s verdict terminating her parental rights to the children. Mother contends she was denied effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. Mother also claims the court improperly directed a verdict on the finding that the children were previously adjudicated deprived. Additionally, Mother asserts State failed to provide clear and convincing evidence in support of termination and failed to demonstrate it was in the children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. This Court rejects Mother’s claims that she was denied effective assistance of counsel or due process of law. This Court further holds clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the children and the court’s determination that it is in the children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The trial court’s order is affirmed. Opinion by BELL, J.; SWINTON, P.J., and GOREE, J., concur. Oct. 5, 2026
123,597 – Chisholm Oil and Gas Operating, L.L.C., a Delaware Limited Liability Company and Cottonmouth SWD, L.L.C., a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff/Appellees, v. R&M Pipeline Services, Inc., an Oklahoma Corporation, Defendant, and Berry Tarp, an individual and Bryan Action Co., and Iowa Corporation, Defendants/Appellants. Appeal from the District Court of Garfield County, Oklahoma. Honorable Paul K. Woodward, Trial Judge. Appellants/Defendants, Barry Tarp and Bryan Auction Company, seek review of the November 3, 2025 Garfield County District Court order granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs/Appellees, Chisholm Oil and Gas Operating, L.L.C. and Cottonmouth SWD, L.L.C. The district court found Plaintiffs and Defendant, R&M Pipeline Services, Inc. (Defendant below), entered into a bailment agreement by oral contract, wherein poly pipe used in the oil and gas production process was stored at R&M’s property but was owned by Plaintiffs. The district court decision granting partial summary judgment is AFFIRMED. Opinion by GOREE, J.; SWINTON, P.J., and BELL, J., concur. Oct. 6, 2026
Division II
Division III
Division IV
122,411 – Carolyn Martin, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. Moshe Tal and Tal-Solomon, LLC, Defendants/Appellants. Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County, Hon. Jeff Virgin, Trial Judge. Defendants, Moshe Tal and Tal-Solomon, LLC, (collectively referred to as Defendants) appeal the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law finding that plaintiff, Carolyn Martin, (Ms. Martin) is the record owner of certain property located in Cleveland County, Oklahoma, and quieting title in the Cleveland County property in her favor and against Defendants. The district court also held that Defendants did not have any interest in the Cleveland County property, either in law or equity. Defendants claim the district court erred because they are the owners of the Cleveland County property via a contract of sale or by adverse possession. After a review of the appellate record and applicable law, we find the district court’s decision was not against the clear weight of the evidence. We affirm the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. AFFIRMED. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, by HUBER, J.; BLACKWELL, P.J., and BARNES, J., concur. Sept. 30, 2026
122,783 – JP Energy Marketing, LLC, and JP Energy Development, LP, PlaintiffsAppellants, vs. Commerce & Industry Insurance Company, a foreign insurance company; Navigators Insurance Company, a foreign insurance company; and Bitco General Insurance Corporation, a foreign insurance company, Defendants/Appellees; and Alterra America Insurance Company, a foreign insurance company, Defendant. Appeal from the District Court of Payne County, Hon. Michael A. Kulling, Trial Judge. Plaintiffs/Appellants, JP Energy Marketing, LLC and JP Energy Development, LP, appeal an order from the district court dismissing their case, without prejudice, for failure to prosecute. On review of the record and applicable law, the order dismissing this case for failure to prosecute is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, by HUBER, J.; BLACKWELL, P.J., and BARNES, J., concur. Oct. 1, 2026
124,229 – Cameron Grace, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Hannah Grace, Respondent/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Bryan County, Hon. Mark R. Campbell, Trial Judge. Petitioner seeks review of the “Court’s Order as to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Due to Jurisdiction.” In this marital dissolution action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise its authority in favor of an out-of-state child custody proceeding under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 43 O.S. 2021 §§ 551-101 et seq., and we affirm that aspect of the trial court’s order. However, we reverse the court’s outright dismissal and direct the trial court, on remand, to vacate the dismissal and stay the proceedings upon the condition that the out-of-state child custody proceeding be pursued to a determination. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, by BARNES, J.; BLACKWELL, P.J., and HUBER, J., concur. Oct. 2, 2026