Dispositions Other Than By Published Opinion | Sept. 27, 2023
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
Division I
Division II
120,881 – Lance Payne, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. Cavanal Hill Distributors, Inc., and BOKF, N.A., Defendants/Appellants. Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Hon. Aletia Haynes Timmons, Trial Judge. Cavanal Hill Distributors, Inc. (Cavanal Hill) appeals the trial court’s order holding it would waive the right to arbitration if it failed to commence arbitration within sixty (60) days. We find this issue is moot because Cavanal Hill complied with the court’s order and initiated arbitration. BOKF, N.A. also appeals the trial court’s order which denied its motion to compel arbitration. The issue on appeal is whether BOKF, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement between Lance Payne and Cavanal Hill, may compel Payne to arbitrate certain claims under the doctrine of estoppel. Because of the interrelated nature of the facts and claims against BOKF and Cavanal Hill (collectively, Defendants), Payne is estopped from declining to arbitrate his wage claims against BOKF. The trial court therefore erred in denying BOKF’s motion to compel arbitration. The court’s order is reversed in part, and the matter remanded with directions to grant BOKF’s motion to compel arbitration of Payne’s wage claims. Finally, Defendants assert the trial court erred in failing to stay litigation of Payne’s gender discrimination claim pending arbitration. Based on the record before the Court, we find no trial court error and affirm this portion of the order. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, by HIXON, J.; BARNES, V.C.J., and WISEMAN, P.J., concur.
September 25, 2023
120,768 – In the Matter of K.M., a Deprived Child, Jesus Sotelo, Appellant, vs. The State of Oklahoma, Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County, Hon. Bethany Stanley, Trial Judge. Jesus Sotelo (Father) appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, K.M. He alleges only that the court improperly terminated his rights under 10A O.S.2021, § 1-4-904(B)(12), though the court also found termination was proper under the additional ground contained in section 1-4-904(B)(17). He also alleges his due process rights were violated. Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we find termination was proper under both sections 1-4-904(B)(12) and (B)(17), and that no due process violation occurred. Therefore, we affirm the court’s order. AFFIRMED. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, by HIXON, J.; BARNES, V.C.J., and WISEMAN, P.J., concur. September 22, 2023
119,635 – In re the Marriage of: Nina N. Umar, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Gohar Umar, Respondent/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Canadian County, Hon. Khristan K. Strubhar, Trial Judge. Gohar Umar (Husband) appeals the “decree of divorce and dissolution of marriage” asserting trial court error in dividing marital property and debt. After review, we conclude the trial court did not err in its property and debt division. And seeing no other error requiring reversal, the trial court’s decisions subject to this appellate review are affirmed. AFFIRMED. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, by WISEMAN, P.J.; BARNES, V.C.J., and HIXON, J., concur. September 21, 2023
121,161 (Companion with Case No. 121,162) – State of Oklahoma ex rel. Laura Austin Thomas, District Attorney, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. One (1) 2007 Mercedes-Benz, S550, Tag Number: JZW906, VIN: WDDNG71X17A034674; Four Thousand Two Hundred and Five Dollars ($4,205.00), US Currency, Defendants, Larry Wayne McCann, Respondent/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Payne County, Hon. Michael Kulling, Trial Judge. Respondent Larry Wayne McCann appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff State of Oklahoma ex rel. Laura Austin Thomas, District Attorney. State’s motion for summary judgment sought an order of forfeiture pursuant to 63 O.S. § 2-503(A)(4), (6), and (7) asserting the evidentiary material attached to its motion established undisputed facts showing the vehicle and currency were used for illegal activity in violation of these provisions. Because material facts are disputed on the question of whether McCann was using his vehicle at the time for the purpose of distribution, sale or receipt of a controlled dangerous substance, summary judgment in State’s favor on this issue was inappropriate. Given that there are two incongruent evidentiary affidavits in this matter and McCann’s banking documents show disputed facts on a pivotal issue, summary judgment cannot be upheld as to forfeiture of the currency. State has not met its burden to show the absence of disputed facts, a condition indispensable to a valid summary judgment. Because genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute, the trial court incorrectly granted forfeiture as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, by WISEMAN, P.J.; BARNES, V.C.J., and HIXON, J., concur. September 21, 2023
121,162 (Companion with Case No. 121,161) – State of Oklahoma ex rel. Laura Austin Thomas, District Attorney, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. One (1) 2017 Ford Mustang, Tag Number: JZW956, VIN: 1FA6P8CF5H53543315, Defendant, Larry Wayne McCann, Respondent/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Payne County, Hon. Michael Kulling, Trial Judge. Respondent Larry Wayne McCann appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff State of Oklahoma ex rel. Laura Austin Thomas, District Attorney. State’s motion for summary judgment sought an order of forfeiture pursuant to 63 O.S. § 2-503(A)(4) asserting the evidentiary material attached to its motion established undisputed facts showing the vehicle was used for illegal activity in violation of this provision. Because material facts are disputed on the question of whether McCann was using his vehicle at the time for the purpose of distribution, sale or receipt of a controlled dangerous substance, summary judgment as a matter of law in State’s favor was inappropriate. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, by WISEMAN, P.J.; BARNES, V.C.J., and HIXON, J., concur. September 21, 2023
Division III
120,155 – Meador Oil Company, Inc., an Oklahoma limited liability company, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Ricks Well Service, LLC, an Oklahoma limited liability company, Defendant, and Levinson, Smith & Huffman, P.C., Interested Party/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Okmulgee County, Oklahoma. Honorable Pandee Ramirez, Trial Judge. Interested Party/Appellant, Levinson, Smith & Huffman, P.C. (Law Firm), appeals from the trial court’s order awarding Law Firm $23,551.94 in attorney’s fees after its former client, Plaintiff/Appellee, Meador Oil Company, Inc., settled a law suit against Defendant Ricks Well Service, LLC, for an undisclosed sum. Attorney Trevor R. Henson was formerly employed by Law Firm as a shareholder/partner. In August 2018, Plaintiff entered into a Contingency Fee Agreement (Agreement) with Law Firm for the firm to represent Plaintiff against Ricks Well Service. Among other things, the Agreement provided that Plaintiff would pay Law Firm thirty three percent (33%) of the net amount recovered on any settlement reached prior to the beginning of the pretrial conference. In September 2018, Law Firm filed the above lawsuit on behalf of Plaintiff against Ricks Well Service and thereafter performed extensive work on the case. In November 2019, Law Firm terminated Henson’s employment and then sued Henson and others for embezzlement, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and other claims arising out of his conduct while employed by Law Firm. That suit is still pending. On December 20, 2019, Plaintiff issued a client directive requesting the transfer of its representation from Law Firm to Henson. Law Firm filed a notice of attorneys lien in the case. One week after Law Firm formally withdrew from the case, Plaintiff settled its suit against Ricks Well Service following mediation. To date, Law Firm has not been advised of the settlement amount or the amount of any attorney fees recovered as part of the settlement. On Plaintiff’s motion to settle Law Firm’s attorney lien, the trial court held a hearing and awarded Law Firm $23,551.94 in fees and expenses. Law Firm’s subpoenas were quashed by implication. We hold the termination language of the Contingency Fee Agreement did not limit Law Firm’s recovery to the actual time spent and expenses incurred by Law Firm prior to the date Plaintiff terminated its services. The plain and unambiguous terms of the Contingency Fee Agreement make clear that the only fee contemplated by the parties when they entered into the contract was a contingency fee due Law Firm upon settlement of the matter. The “accrued fees” referred to in the termination clause is Law Firm’s portion of any contingency fund collected upon settlement, subject to Oklahoma’s quantum meruit/equitable apportionment jurisprudence. In determining the equitable share of a contingency fee where there are successive attorneys, the trial court should consider: (1) The amount of the settlement or judgment the discharged attorney had a reasonable possibility of realizing had she been permitted to continue in the case; (2) the nature and extent of the services she rendered within the scope of the contingent fee contract; and (3) the nature and extent of the services rendered by the second lawyer. By implicitly quashing Law Firm’s subpoenas, the trial court was without necessary information regarding the amount of the settlement and the nature and extent of the services rendered by Henson after he left the firm’s employ. Without such information, the trial court could not have properly determined the relative contribution of each attorney/firm to the creation of the contingent fee fund. Moreover, the trial court appears to have based its fee award entirely on Law Firm’s hourly rates, which Oklahoma jurisprudence specifically prohibits. Finally, we reject Law Firm’s argument that it is entitled to the entire contingency fee, to be split with Henson according to the partnership agreement it had with him. Law Firm has not included any such putative partnership agreement in the record, nor has it referred this Court to the relevant language thereof. Moreover, quantum meruit/equitable apportionment jurisprudence is premised upon compensating attorneys for the reasonable value of their services and not upon the contingency fee agreement. The trial court erred in implicitly quashing Law Firm’s subpoenas duces tecum and in calculating Law Firm’s attorney fee award. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion by BELL, J.; MITCHELL, C.J., and PRINCE, P.J., concur. September 22, 2023
Division IV