



OKLAHOMA STATE COURTS NETWORK

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Carter v Carter et al.

2025 OK CIV APP 15

Case Number: 122068

Decided: 04/25/2025

Mandate Issued: 05/22/2025

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION I



Cite as: 2025 OK CIV APP 15, __ P.3d __

JESSICA RAYLENE CARTER, Defendant/Appellant

vs.

KATRINA CHARLENE CARTER, C.B.C., Minor, D.K.M., Minor, L.R.G., Minor, Plaintiffs/Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
ROGERS COUNTY, OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE SUE NIGH, TRIAL JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Janice Steidley, STEIDLEY LAW FIRM, Claremore, Oklahoma, For Defendant/Appellant,

Sofia Johnson, Jeff Price, PRICE LAW, PC, Claremore, Oklahoma, For Plaintiffs/Appellees. (Trial Counsel Only) ¹ __

Thomas E. Prince, Judge:

¶1 Jessica Carter (Defendant/Appellant) has appealed the trial court's grant of a Protective Order finding Katrina Carter and two minor children, C.B.C. and D.K.M., (Plaintiffs/Appellees) were victims of harassment as defined by 22 O.S. § 60.1(5). Jessica² alleged on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that she had engaged in a "course or pattern of conduct" sufficient to constitute harassment. We find no error in the trial court's grant of the Protective Order and, accordingly, affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Katrina Carter filed the underlying Petition for Protective Order on December 5, 2023, seeking a Protective Order against Jessica Carter on behalf of herself and three minor children, C.B.C., D.K.M., and L.R.G. Jessica and Katrina are sisters-in-law via marriage, as their respective spouses are brothers, and Jessica is the biological mother of C.B.C. and D.K.M. Katrina is the biological mother of L.R.G. Katrina's Petition alleged Jessica had repeatedly harassed and stalked Katrina and the three minor children on the evening of December 2, 2023 during the town's Christmas parade. At the time of the Petition, Katrina was the guardian of C.B.C. and D.K.M., having been assigned guardianship in a separate action. ³ The relevant terms of the Guardianship Order suspended Jessica's visitation with C.B.C. and D.K.M., limiting Jessica to phone contact only. Jessica was entitled to reinstate visitation with C.B.C. and D.K.M. upon proper application in the guardianship action, but both parties stipulated that, at the time of the underlying proceedings, Jessica had not reapplied for visitation.

¶3 The trial court held a hearing on Katrina's Petition for Protective Order on December 14, 2023, during which both Katrina and Jessica appeared *pro se*. Jessica requested a continuance which the trial court granted, continuing the proceedings until January 4, 2024. When the trial court resumed the proceedings for the January 4, 2024 hearing, Jessica was late to court and did not appear for the calling of the docket, prompting the trial court to enter a five (5) year Final Order of Protection via default judgment. Jessica, thereafter, filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Protective Order, which the trial court granted on February 1, 2024, following a hearing. After setting aside the Default Protective Order, the trial court scheduled another hearing for Katrina's Petition for Protective Order for February 29, 2024.

¶4 The trial court reconvened for the hearing⁴ on February 29, 2024, where Katrina testified that she and her husband, Patrick Carter, took C.B.C., D.K.M., and L.R.G. to the Chelsea Christmas Parade at approximately 6:00 PM on December 2, 2023. Soon after their arrival at the parade, Katrina spotted Jessica nearby, leading Katrina to move with the children to the opposite end of the parade so to avoid interaction. While watching the parade from their new location, Katrina observed Jessica cross from the opposite side of the street to move closer to Katrina, Patrick, and the three children. Katrina attempted to walk the children away from Jessica, but Jessica managed to catch up to them while Katrina had briefly stopped to greet some acquaintances. Katrina testified that Jessica grabbed D.K.M. from behind by his shoulder, causing the child to immediately turn to Katrina and state "we need to go." Katrina attested to asking Jessica to stop following them before taking the children across the street.

¶5 After the group relocated and continued watching the parade, Katrina turned around to see Jessica, again, standing right next to the children. Katrina recounted stepping in between the children and Jessica, which caused Jessica to get very upset and start to scream about her outrage over Katrina's guardianship of C.B.C. and D.K.M. As the situation escalated, Katrina noted that one of the children began to cry, spurring Katrina to wrap her arms around the three children in an attempt to move them away from Jessica. At this point, Katrina explained that Patrick moved in between Jessica and the rest of the group, after which Jessica began to scream in Patrick's face and shout derogatory statements about drug use. Katrina described her attempts to walk the children away but indicated that Jessica continued following the group until one of the children began yelling at Jessica. Katrina and Patrick then managed to separate the group from Jessica, after which they called the police. Katrina described the children's demeanor after the incident as "angry, emotionally distraught, [and] scared," noting that D.K.M. "shut down" and was afraid to go out much. When asked why Katrina felt like she and the children needed a Protective Order, she stated that she "believe[d] that these instances [were] going to continue to happen" and that she "want[ed] to be able to take the kids to events in the town that they live in and not be afraid of these things happening." Katrina stated that a protective order would serve the best interests of the children and expressed her fear that, without a protective order, Jessica would continue to attempt to contact the children.

¶6 Jessica also testified as to her recollection of the December 2, 2023 incident, explaining that she attended the Christmas parade with her boyfriend and a good friend, but did not know that her two biological children would also be in attendance. Jessica indicated that after first noticing Katrina, Patrick, and the three children at the parade, Jessica gestured "I love you" to one of the children, which Jessica stated the child reciprocated. Jessica attested to crossing to the same side of the street as Katrina, Patrick, and the children and standing stationary behind them. Despite the fact that Jessica saw the children across the street and, subsequently, crossed the street to stand directly behind them, Jessica maintained that she was not following Katrina, Patrick, and the children. Jessica recalled Katrina told her to stay away and, thereafter, Katrina walked the children away.

¶7 Jessica maintained that she continued to walk around the parade festivities and, again, found herself standing an arms-length distance away from Katrina, Patrick, and the children as a matter of happenstance. Jessica explained that she reached out to touch D.K.M.'s shoulder to tell him that she loved him, but, soon after, Katrina noticed Jessica and began to take pictures, telling Jessica to "get away from [her] boys." Jessica admitted that Katrina's reference to C.B.C. and D.K.M. as "her boys," caused Jessica to get very upset, even acknowledging that she told a responding officer it was at that moment when she "lost it." Jessica stated that she began to yell at Katrina and Patrick that C.B.C. and D.K.M. were "not [their] boys" and will "never be [their] boys". When Patrick positioned himself in between Jessica, Katrina, and the children, Jessica claimed that Patrick began calling

Jessica mean names and slurs, after which Jessica attested to accusing Patrick of drug use. Jessica contended she was not the aggressor, maintaining she only started yelling after Patrick "got in her face", but admitted that, despite Katrina's repeated requests to leave them alone, Jessica chose not to walk away. Jessica stated that she decided to walk away only after she saw C.B.C. get visibly upset and tell Jessica "Mom, just leave, just leave." After separating, Jessica attested to making a verbal report with a police officer at the parade, but confirmed she never completed a written statement of the incident. Jessica's testimony additionally confirmed she was well aware of the Guardianship Order and its restriction of Jessica's physical contact with the children.

¶8 In addition to Katrina and Jessica's testimony, Officer Roy Fincel also provided testimony of the incident as the responding officer, largely corroborating Katrina's account of the events. Officer Fincel first spoke with Katrina and Patrick who informed Officer Fincel that Jessica had accosted them at the Christmas Parade. After getting statements from both Katrina and Patrick, Officer Fincel spoke with one of the minor children who provided his recollection of the incident. Officer Fincel described the child's demeanor as scared, frightened, and angry, noting the child was crying and looking over his shoulder as he tried to recount the incident with Jessica. Officer Fincel testified that nothing the child said caused him to disbelieve Katrina's account of the December 2nd incident. After collecting information from Katrina and Patrick, Officer Fincel spoke with Jessica, who maintained she had not been following Katrina, Patrick, and the children, but admitted to making contact with Patrick when the situation escalated. Officer Fincel maintained that Jessica informed him that there was a lot of yelling, and that she had made some derogatory statements about drug use. Officer Fincel additionally noted that he asked both Katrina and Jessica to complete a voluntary written statement describing the incident, but only Katrina ended up completing a written statement which was included in the record.

¶9 Upon consideration, the trial court granted Katrina, D.K.M., and C.B.C. two-year protective orders based upon Jessica's harassment on December 2, 2023, but found that L.R.G. did not qualify for a protective order. The trial court found that Jessica exhibited a "course of conduct" constituting harassment by continuing to follow Katrina, Patrick, and the children despite Katrina's concerted effort to move away from Jessica. The trial court concluded that, from Katrina's perspective, "Ms. Jessica Carter was pursuing the plaintiffs, to get closer." The trial court referenced Katrina's testimony that Jessica repeatedly screamed at her, causing the youngest child to cry while the other two were unsure what to do. Although Katrina and Jessica had conflicting accounts of the December 2, 2023 incident, the trial court found that Officer Fincel's "very specific" testimony corroborated the "substantial distress that this mother caused her child." The trial court explicitly stated that "the testimony from [Jessica] [was] not credible", while finding that Katrina's testimony "was credible", ultimately granting the protective orders "based on the credibility of the witnesses and the greater weight of the evidence and based upon a review of [Jessica's pictures from the parade], as well as the stipulation entered by the parties". Jessica, thereafter, initiated this timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 A trial court's issuance of a protective order is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. *Curry v. Streater*, 2009 OK 5, ¶ 8, 213 P.3d 550, 554. Under an abuse of discretion standard, we examine the evidence in the record and reverse only if the trial court's decision is clearly against the evidence or is contrary to a governing principle of law. *Id.* (citing *State ex rel. Tal v. Oklahoma City*, 2002 OK 97, ¶ 3, 61 P.3d 234, 240). To reverse under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court must find the trial court's conclusions and judgment were clearly erroneous, against reason and evidence. *Id.* (citing *Oklahoma Tpk. Auth. v. Little*, 1993 OK 116, ¶ 6, 860 P.2d 226, 228). This appeal also raises issues of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law subject to *de novo* review. *Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Paredes*, 2023 OK 42 ¶ 3, 528 P.3d 772, 774. *De novo* review provides this Court with plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings. *Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth.*, 1993 OK 85, ¶ 14, 859 P.2d 1081, 1084.

ANALYSIS

¶11 Jessica has alleged three issues⁵ on appeal, from which we garnered a single issue necessitating our resolution: whether Jessica's actions over the course of one evening constituted a "course or pattern of conduct" which rose to the level of "harassment" as defined by 22 O.S. § 60.1(5). We find no error in the trial court's grant of a protective order based upon Jessica's harassment of Katrina, C.B.C., and D.K.M. and, therefore, affirm.

¶12 The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act ("the Act") allows a victim of domestic abuse, stalking, harassment, or rape to petition the court for a protection order. *Curry v. Streater*, 2009 OK 5, ¶ 9, 213 P.3d 550, 554 (citing 22 O.S. Supp. 2003, §§ 60.1--60.2). The Act defines "harassment" as:

'Harassment' means a knowing and willful course or pattern of conduct by a family or household member or an individual who is or has been involved in a dating relationship with the person, directed at a specific person which seriously alarms or annoys the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and must actually cause substantial distress to the person. 'Harassment' shall include, but not be limited to, harassing or obscene telephone calls in violation of Section 1172 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes and fear of death or bodily injury;

22 O.S. § 60.1(5). Accordingly, a party seeking a protective order based on alleged harassment must show that the defendant's behavior constituted "a knowing and willful course or pattern of conduct". See e.g., *Watts v. Hensley*, 2000 OK CIV APP 41, ¶ 6, 4 P.3d 45, 46. The Act also imposes objective and subjective standards to evaluate the conduct at issue, requiring the party seeking the protective order to demonstrate both that the conduct "would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress" and that the conduct "actually cause[d] substantial distress to the person." See e.g., *Null v. Polin*, 2014 OK CIV APP 12, ¶ 25, 319 P.3d 689, 693.

¶13 A "one-time occurrence" is considered inadequate for purposes of a claim of "harassment." See *Curry v. Streater*, 2009 OK 5, ¶ 12, 213 P.3d 550, 555. The phrase "course or pattern of conduct", as used in § 60.1(5) (which defines "harassment") is not further defined for purposes of a claim of harassment.⁶ See *Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.*, 1992 OK 72, 833 P.2d 1218, 1228 ("[t]o ascertain legislative intent we look to the language of the pertinent statute. Statutory words are to be given their ordinary sense except when a contrary intention plainly appears"); *Hill v. Board of Education, District I-009, Jones, Oklahoma*, 1997 OK 107, 944 P.2d 930, 931 ("[t]he fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the Legislature's intention and purpose as expressed in a statute"). Generally, when determining the meaning of a statute, the plain language of the statute is conclusive absent an ambiguity. *In the Matter of the Estate of Foresee*, 2020 OK 88, ¶ 14, 475 P.3d 862, 867. The term "course" has been defined as "a chosen manner of conducting oneself: way of acting". See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/course; and the term "pattern" has been defined as "a reliable sample of traits, acts, tendencies, or other observable characteristics of a person, group, or institution. See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pattern.

¶14 In this case, Jessica argues that her behavior over the course of a single evening could not have constituted a "course or pattern of conduct", maintaining it was an isolated incident which did not present a pattern of harassment. In support of this contention, Jessica analogized her conduct to that of the defendants in both *Curry v. Streater*, 2009 OK 5, 213 P.3d 550 and *Watts v. Hensley*, 2000 OK CIV APP 41, 4 P.3d 45. We, however, find both these cases distinguishable from the underlying facts. In *Curry*, the party seeking the protective order cited only a single verbal exchange in isolation as alleged "harassment," and the Supreme Court found that the single event, alone, could not constitute a "course or pattern of conduct". In *Watts*, a teacher sought a protective order against a parent based upon the parent's alleged harassment, citing to two "altercations" which occurred in quick succession. The first occurred between the two parties in the school gymnasium, after which the teacher brought the parent into her office and briefly left to locate the school superintendent. The second occurred shortly thereafter upon the teacher and superintendent's return to the office. This Court found that these two "altercations" only constituted a single event and, thus, were insufficient to demonstrate "a course or pattern of conduct" necessary to establish "harassment" under 22 O.S. § 60.1(5). *Watts* is distinguishable from the facts in this case because the teacher there did not try to escape from or otherwise avoid further interaction with the

parent. Rather, the teacher voluntarily directed the parent to go to her office where she had him briefly wait before returning with the superintendent. *Id.*, ¶ 2. Upon returning to the gymnasium office, only the superintendent met with the parent while the teacher waited outside the office and did not actually interact again with the parent that day. *Id.*, at ¶ 2. Thus, the facts in *Watts* revealed a single interaction between the parties. *Id.*, at ¶ 7. Moreover, in *Watts*, there was no attempt by the teacher to permanently separate herself from the parent after their "altercation."

¶15 Unlike the defendants in *Curry* and *Watts*, Jessica repeatedly followed and attempted to interact with Katrina, Patrick, and the children despite their concerted efforts to stay away from Jessica. Katrina and Jessica's testimony confirmed that Jessica attempted to approach the children several times over the course of the evening and that Katrina continuously asked Jessica to leave them alone. Jessica admitted that she did not walk away after these requests, instead requiring Katrina, Patrick, and the children to attempt to continuously evade Jessica's pursuit of the group throughout the course of the evening. Here, Katrina and Patrick made several attempts to get away from Jessica every time she was nearby, making clear they did not want her to interact with the children as stipulated by the Guardianship Order. The facts here do not show a single event. Katrina and Patrick separated themselves from Jessica following each incident, causing a reasonable person to likely view the various incidents to demonstrate an observable characteristic, tendency, or way of acting by Jessica that she would likely repeat without the issuance of the requested protective order. Accordingly, we find that Jessica's repeated attempts to interact with Katrina, Patrick, and the children over the course of one evening, in addition to her refusal to abide by their requests to leave the children alone, constituted "a knowing and willful course or pattern of conduct".

¶16 Jessica further maintained that her behavior did not cause Katrina, C.B.C. and D.K.M. to "actually fear[] death, bodily injury or experience[] emotional distress." We are unconvinced. Beyond Katrina's testimony regarding of her own emotional state, Katrina also attested that the children were angry, emotionally distraught, and scared following the incident, leading one of the children to "shut down" and become reclusive. Officer Fincel further corroborated Katrina's recitation of events, noting that he personally observed the children's obvious emotional distress when asking the child questions about what had happened. Even Jessica, herself, confirmed the children were visibly distressed following the incident, as Jessica specifically testified that she decided to walk away only after noticing that one of the children was very upset and pleading with her to "just leave." The bulk of the evidence on appeal hinged upon witness testimony, and, after weighing the evidence, the trial court was, ultimately, more compelled by Katrina and Officer Fincel's account of the incident. The credibility of witnesses and the effect and weight of conflicting or inconsistent testimony are questions of fact to be determined by the trier of fact and are not questions of law for this Court on appeal. *Bills v. Bills*, 2022 OK CIV APP 27, ¶ 14, 514 P.3d 485, 489 (citing *Estate of Gerard v. Gerard*, 1995 OK 144, ¶18, 911 P.2d 266). As the trial court was "in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses and to gauge the credibility of the evidence," we will defer to the trial court as to the conclusions it reaches concerning those witnesses and that evidence. *Matter of Estate of Whitehouse*, 2020 OK CIV APP 59, ¶ 15, 479 P.3d 230, 233 (citing *Stephens Production Co., a division of SF Holding Corp. v. Larsen*, 2017 OK 36, ¶ 12, 394 P.3d 1262); *Berry & Berry Acquisitions, LLC v. BFN Properties LLC*, 2018 OK 27, ¶ 19, 416 P.3d 1061, 1070.

CONCLUSION

¶17 Based upon the foregoing analysis, we find no error in the trial court's grant of a protective order based upon Jessica's harassment of Katrina, C.B.C., and D.K.M. The record supports the trial court's finding that Jessica engaged in a "knowing and willful course or pattern of conduct" which would both cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress *and* actually caused Katrina, C.B.C., and D.K.M. substantial emotional distress. Accordingly, the trial court's Order is affirmed.

SWINTON, J., concurs and GOREE, P.J., concurs in result.

GOREE, P.J., concurring in result:

I concur that issuing the Protective Order was not an abuse of discretion. The Order of Protection, paragraph (C) (5), prohibits Defendant from both harassing and stalking. I would affirm the Order based on the definition of stalking, which includes "repeated following . . . of a person by an adult . . ." 22 O.S. §60.1(10).

FOOTNOTES

¹ We note at the outset that Katrina Carter neither filed a response to the petition in error, nor did she file a response brief, leaving us to rely exclusively upon Jessica Carter's Br. in Chief. When an appeal proceeds solely upon an appellant's brief, we bear no duty "to search the record for some theory to sustain the trial court judgment," and will, ordinarily, reverse the appealed order "where the brief-in-chief is reasonably supportive of the allegations of error". *Sneed v. Sneed*, 1978 OK 138, ¶ 10, 585 P.2d 1363, 1366. Nevertheless, "(r)eversal is never automatic" as the trial court's order "is presumed correct until the contrary has been shown by the record." *Holeman v. White*, 2012 OK CIV APP 107, ¶ 9, 292 P.3d 65, 67 (citing *Hamid v. Sew Original*, 1982 OK 46, 645 P.2d 496, 497).

Thomas E. Prince, Judge:

² As a matter of practice, this Court does not refer to parties to an appeal by their first name. The parties in this appeal, however, share the last name "Carter," which required clear distinctions between Ms. (Jessica) Carter and Ms. (Katrina) Carter during the trial court proceedings. For the sake of clarity, we will identify the parties by their first names in this Opinion.

³ Katrina Carter was assigned guardianship of C.B.C. and D.K.M. in Rogers County Case No. PG-2022-85, which was memorialized in a Minute Order on September 18, 2023. While the Minute Order was not included in the appellate record, the contents of the Order were discussed at length during the February 29, 2024 hearing, and the relevant language was read verbatim on the record.

⁴ The February 29, 2024 hearing dealt with both Katrina (PO-2023-499) and Patrick's (PO-2023-498) separate Petitions for Protective Order against Jessica. However, Patrick moved to dismiss his Petition in the midst of the hearing, leaving only Katrina's Petition for the trial court's consideration.

⁵ Jessica Carter asserted the following issues in her Pet. in Error: (1) Whether a protective order petition is sufficient to be determined under "stalking" when the Petitioner states one incident, and where the testimony taken fails to support an award of a PO based on stalking as only one incident was taken as evidence; (2) Whether a protective order petition is sufficient to be determined under "harassment" when the Petitioner states one incident, and where the testimony taken fails to support an award of a PO based on harassment as only one incident was taken as evidence; and (3) Whether the Defendant's due process rights were violated when the trial court allowed the Petitioner to testify to what minor children, who are listed within the PO, said without a proper hearsay exception and without the Defendant having the ability to properly cross examine the minor children.

While we address issue two (2) in the body of this Opinion, Jessica failed to brief issues one (1) and three (3) in her Br.-in-Chief, and we will not consider propositions of error which are unaddressed in an appellate brief. *Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall*, 1974 OK 138, ¶ 5, 544 P.2d 505, 507 ("[a]ssignments of alleged error not presented in the briefs will be treated as abandoned."); *Perry v. Meek*, 1980 OK 151, ¶ 13, 618 P.2d 934, 938 ("[t]he absence of argument and authorities on a point of error preserved by a petition in error is deemed abandonment of that point."); *McLaughlin v. McLaughlin*, 1999 OK 34, ¶ 2 n. 1, 979 P.2d 257, 259 ("[c]laims to error for which there is no support in argument and authority are deemed abandoned."). Further, with regard to issue three (3) concerning alleged hearsay testimony, our review of the February 29, 2024 hearing transcript revealed that Jessica's attorney opened the door for testimony related to the children's statements/emotions following the incident, as Jessica's attorney specifically asked Katrina on cross-examination the following: "Isn't it true that the children could have been distraught just because you're yelling, your husband's yelling, my client's yelling?" and "You're testifying that their distraughtness and everything that you've described as their demeanor had nothing to do with the way you acted or your husband acted?".

⁶ The definition of the term "stalking" includes a description of the phrase "course of conduct". See 22 O.S., § 60.1(10): 10. "Stalking" means the willful, malicious, and repeated following or harassment of a person by an adult, emancipated minor, or minor thirteen (13) years of age or older, in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to feel frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and actually causes the person being followed or harassed to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed or molested. **Stalking also means a course of conduct composed of a series of two or more separate acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose or unconsented contact with a person that is initiated or continued without the consent of the individual** or in disregard of the expressed desire of the individual that the contact be avoided or discontinued. Unconsented contact or course of conduct includes, but is not limited to:

- a. maintaining a visual or physical proximity to the individual,
- b. approaching or confronting that individual in a public place or on private property,
- c. appearing at the workplace of the individual or contacting the employer or coworkers of the individual,
- d. appearing at the residence of the individual or contacting the neighbors of the individual,
- e. entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or occupied by the individual,
- f. contacting the individual by telephone, text message, electronic message, electronic mail, or other means of electronic communication or causing the telephone or electronic device of the individual or the telephone or electronic device of any other person to ring or generate notifications repeatedly or continuously, regardless of whether a conversation ensues,
- g. photographing, videotaping, audiotaping, or, through any other electronic means, monitoring or recording the activities of the individual. This subparagraph applies regardless of where the act occurs,
- h. sending any physical or electronic material or contacting the individual by any means, including any message, comment, or other content posted on any Internet site or web application,
- i. sending to a family member or member of the household of the individual, or any current or former employer of the individual, or any current or former coworker of the individual, or any friend of the individual, any physical or electronic material or contacting such person by any means, including any message, comment, or other content posted on any Internet site or web application, for the purpose of obtaining information about, disseminating information about, or communicating with the individual,
- j. placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased or occupied by the individual,

- k. delivering an object to a family member or member of the household of the individual, or an employer, coworker, or friend of the individual, or placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by such a person with the intent that the object be delivered to the individual, or
- l. causing a person to engage in any of the acts described in subparagraphs a through k of this paragraph; and . . . " .

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Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Cases

Cite	Name	Level
<u>2012 OK CIV APP 107</u> , <u>292 P.3d 65</u> ,	<u>HOLEMAN v. WHITE</u>	Discussed
<u>2014 OK CIV APP 12</u> , <u>319 P.3d 689</u> ,	<u>NULL v. POLIN</u>	Discussed
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<u>2000 OK CIV APP 41</u> , <u>4 P.3d 45</u> , <u>71</u> <u>OBJ 1334</u> ,	<u>WATTS v. HENSLEY</u>	Discussed at Length
<u>2022 OK CIV APP 27</u> , <u>514 P.3d 485</u> ,	<u>BILLS v. BILLS</u>	Discussed

Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases

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<u>1992 OK 72</u> , <u>833 P.2d 1218</u> , <u>63 OBJ</u> <u>1507</u> ,	<u>Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.</u>	Discussed
<u>1993 OK 85</u> , <u>859 P.2d 1081</u> , <u>64 OBJ</u> <u>2009</u> ,	<u>Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Authority</u>	Discussed
<u>1993 OK 116</u> , <u>860 P.2d 226</u> , <u>64 OBJ</u> <u>2879</u> ,	<u>Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Little</u>	Discussed
<u>1997 OK 107</u> , <u>944 P.2d 930</u> , <u>68 OBJ</u> <u>2775</u> ,	<u>HILL v. BOARD OF EDUCATION</u>	Discussed
<u>1995 OK 144</u> , <u>911 P.2d 266</u> , <u>66 OBJ</u> <u>4001</u> ,	<u>Estate of Gerard v. Gerard</u>	Discussed
<u>2002 OK 97</u> , <u>61 P.3d 234</u> ,	<u>STATE ex rel. TAL v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY</u>	Discussed
<u>2009 OK 5</u> , <u>213 P.3d 550</u> ,	<u>CURRY v. STREATER</u>	Discussed at Length
<u>1974 OK 138</u> , <u>544 P.2d 505</u> ,	<u>CHRISTIE-STEWART. INC. v. PASCHALL</u>	Discussed
<u>1978 OK 138</u> , <u>585 P.2d 1363</u> ,	<u>SNEED v. SNEED</u>	Discussed
<u>2017 OK 36</u> , <u>394 P.3d 1262</u> ,	<u>STEPHENS PRODUCTION COMPANY v. LARSEN</u>	Discussed
<u>2018 OK 27</u> , <u>416 P.3d 1061</u> ,	<u>BERRY AND BERRY ACQUISITIONS v. BFN PROPERTIES</u>	Discussed
<u>1980 OK 151</u> , <u>618 P.2d 934</u> ,	<u>Perry v. Meek</u>	Discussed
<u>2020 OK 88</u> , <u>475 P.3d 862</u> ,	<u>IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FORESEE</u>	Discussed
<u>2023 OK 42</u> , <u>528 P.3d 772</u> ,	<u>SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. PAREDES</u>	Discussed
<u>1982 OK 46</u> , <u>645 P.2d 496</u> ,	<u>Hamid v. Sew Original</u>	Discussed
<u>1999 OK 34</u> , <u>979 P.2d 257</u> , <u>70 OBJ</u> <u>1364</u> ,	<u>McLaughlin v. McLaughlin</u>	Discussed

Title 22. Criminal Procedure

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22 O.S. 60.1,

Level

Definitions

Discussed at Length